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APPELLANTS5 REPLY BRIEF 
I. ONCE AN APPLICANT MAKES A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NON-
IMPAIRMENT, THE BURDEN OF PROVING IMPAIRMENT SHIFTS TO 
THE PROTESTANT. 
The State Engineer initially argues that the burden never shifts from a change 
applicant to a protestant to prove impairment, even after the change applicant makes a 
prima facie showing of non-impairment. (Eng'r Br. at 22.) Thus, the State Engineer 
asserts the trial court erred in shifting the burden of proof to Milburn after the Searles 
made their prima facie case. (See id.) 
The first problem with this argument is that it is not clear whether the trial court 
shifted the burden of production or proof to Milburn, because its decision does not 
expressly state as much. (Op. at 9-10,Tflj6-8.) In fact, none of the parties specifically 
brought to the trial court's attention whether the burden that shifted to Milburn was one 
of proof or production. (R. passim.) While this Court can affirm the trial court on 
alternative grounds, even where such grounds are not raised below, it can only do so 
when the alternate legal ground or theory is "apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bayles, 
2002 UT 58, f^l3 & n.3, 52 P.3d 1158. The unclear language in the trial court's decision 
and the lack of a record on the issue deprives this Court of the opportunity to accept the 
State Engineer's initial argument, and affirm on that basis alone. See id. at ^13 n.3. 
The second problem with this argument is that it is an incorrect statement of the 
law. The State Engineer bases his argument on general case law addressing motions to 
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dismiss, burdens of proof in general civil and criminal cases, and a claim that Crafts v. 
Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1983) merely refers to "shifting [the] burden of production 
of evidence, not the ultimate burden of proof." (Eng'r Br. at 19.) 
In Crafts, this Court said just the opposite of what the State Engineer seeks to have 
this Court imply. There the court stated that once an applicant makes a prima facie 
showing that there is reason to believe his change can be lawfully approved the burden of 
"proving" impairment shifts to the protestant. Crafts, 667 P.2d at 1081 (emphasis 
added). Of course, this has always been the standard. See Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 
378, 77 P.2d 362, 366-67 (1938) (showing of general negative of non-impairment by 
applicant is sufficient "to put the protestant on proof 'that he would be injured" (emphasis 
added)); Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 Utah 164, 174-75, 48 P.2d 484, 488-89 (1935) 
(rejecting argument that burden of proving non-impairment remains, at all times, with the 
applicant). 
In sum, after ruling that the Searles met their burden of showing non-impairment, 
the trial court correctly shifted the burden of proving impairment to Milburn. It is 
whether Milburn's factual showing was sufficient to sustain a finding of impairment that 
is the central issue on appeal. 
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IT VPPELLEES' PROPOSED STANDARD OF P R O O F C O N F L K I S \V 1111 
ESTABLISHED P R E C E D E N T AND IS A T ODDS W I T H THE 
PRELIMINARY N A T U R E OF C H A N G E USE APPLICATIONS. 
A. A Preponderance Of The Evidence Standard For Showing 
Impairment, By Definition, Leaves Doubt About Whether Impairment 
Might Actually Result If A Change Is Approved . 
Milburn and the State Engineer focus their attention on the preponderance of the 
evidence standard. They assert that under a preponderance of the evidence standard, the 
trial court 's finding of a likely hydrologic connection is sufficient to show impairment as 
a matter of law because the preponderance of the evidence standard onK requires a 
showing of "more likely than not." (Mil. Br. at 14-18 (citing Harken Southwest Corp. v. 
State ex. Rel. Dep ' t of Natural Resources, 920 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996) (defining 
preponderance of the evidence as "more likely than not."); Eng ' r Br. at 23.) 
However, this standard simply cannot be squared with long-standing precedent 
which requires more than a factual showing that approval of an application might, 
possibly, could, or has the potential to impair vested rights. See American Fork Irrigation 
Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 95, 239 P.2d 188, 191 (1951). See also Brief of Appellants at 
22-24, 33-35 discussing cases in Utah and other western states which establish this 
principle. 
Regardless of the spin Milburn and the State Engineer place on the term, a finding 
of a likely connection is no better than a showing of a possible or potential connection. 
The State Engineer indicated as much in his memorandum decision, stating "[g]iven the 
likely possibility of fractures in the geologic strata, the area proposed for diversion could 
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serve as a contributing source for the protestanf s water supply." (Mem. Dec. March 8, 
2002) (Emphasis added.)1 Indeed, in this context, "likely" is simply a euphemism for 
"possibly" or "could." This is not enough under our case law. 
Moreover, as set forth in our opening brief (at 23, 31), this Court has held that in a 
doubtful case, where the conclusion is not clear, the policy of this state is to approve the 
application. See Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball 76 Utah 243, 248, 289 P. 116, 
118 (1930). Milbum asserts this is not a doubtful case, but advances a standard that by 
definition leaves some level of doubt and uncertainty. Thus, if this case turns on the 
evidentiary standard, as Milburn argues, the standard cannot be preponderance of the 
evidence. 
The standard that removes the doubt and uncertainty is the standard we advanced 
below, a standard that requires the protestant to show clearly and definitively—clearly 
and convincingly—that its rights will be impaired. Proof is not clear and convincing "if 
the court entertains reasonable doubt." Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. 
Ca, 118 Utah 41, 44, 233 P.2d 699, 700 (1951). This is what we argued below. (R. 175 
Tr. 256, 257:1-2.) To be clear and convincing, a matter 
must at least have reached a point where there remains no serious or 
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. A mind which 
was of the opinion that it was convinced and yet which entertained not a 
slight, but a reasonable doubt as to the correctness of its conclusion would 
seem to be in a state of confusion. 
Kirchgestner, 118 Utah at 44, 233 P.2d at 700 (citation omitted). Moreover, clear and 
convincing proof "has the element of clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and 
1
 Attached at Addendum C to our opening brief. 
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convincing proof clinches what might be otherwise probable to the mind." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
This is the standard that removes the doubt from these cases and furthers the 
policy of ensuring that water is put to beneficial use, that an applicant will be allowed a 
period of experimentation to show, once and for all, that the change will not impair 
vested rights, and will ensure that the State Engineer (and trial court on de novo review) 
is not adjudicating water rights. The trial court's finding that there is a likely connection 
between Milbum's source of water and the Searles' proposed source of supply because, 
as stated by the trial court, "the water has got to come from somewhere," (R. 175 Tr. 
266:21) does not meet the legal standard for showing impairment. 
Thus, while this Court can defer to the trial court's finding of a "likely" hydrologic 
connection,2 it should reverse the ultimate conclusion that such a finding constitutes 
impairment as a matter of law. See Low v. City of Monticello, 2004 UT 90, ^[11, 103 
P.3d 130 (appellate court defers to trial court's factual findings but grants no deference to 
its conclusions that such findings constitute the legal issue in question). 
2
 Both Milburn (Mil. Br. at 21) and the State Engineer (Eng'r Br. at 4) somewhat 
indirectly refer to the marshaling requirement. However, we do not lodge a challenge to 
the trial court's factual finding that there is a likely hydrologic connection, i.e., we do not 
assert this finding is clearly erroneous. Rather, we assert that the finding, as a matter of 
law, does not constitute impairment. Thus, this Court cannot affirm for the sole reason 
that we seek a legal determination on the effect of an unchallenged finding. See Saunders 
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, (Utah 1991) (once appellate court affirms factual findings, it 
must then proceed to "review the trial court's conclusions of law and its application of 
the law to the facts as found."). 
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B. This Court Did Not Establish A Preponderance Of The Evidence 
Standard In Crafts. 
Milburn grounds its argument for a preponderance standard by quoting dicta from 
Crafts, wherein a majority of the court referred to a protestant's burden as showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a change cannot lawfully be approved. Slee Crafts, 
667 P.2d at 1081 (Durham, J., joined by Howe & Stewart, JJ.). However, in Crafts, the 
"sole issue" before the court was whether there existed a genuine issue of material fact 
precluding summary judgment. Id, at 1069. The majority's language concerning a 
preponderance of the evidence standard was therefore dicta and "of no particular concern 
as precedent." Knight v. Chamberlain, 6 Utah 2d 394, 396, 315 P.2d 273, 274 (1957) 
(questions not directly presented for review are dicta and do not create binding 
precedent); see also DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah 1995) Oudicial statements 
made in the course of discussion of an issue not directly confronting the court do not 
constitute the holding of the court). 
Indeed, it would be illogical to believe that the majority would, at the outset of its 
opinion reiterate the standard it had been articulating since at least 1954, see Crafts, 667 
P.2d at 1070, then at the conclusion of its opinion intentionally abandon this standard, 
particularly where the issue was not placed squarely before the court complete with 
briefing on the competing arguments and interests—as in the instant case. If Milburn is 
correct, then so was Justice Oaks in asserting that the majority was unwittingly reversing 
long-standing precedent. See id. at 1082-83 (Oaks, J., dissenting). 
The State Engineer concedes this point in his brief. (Eng'r Br. at 19.) 
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However, we need not go that far. If the majority in Crafts intended to overrule 
long-standing precedent it could have easily said so in that case. It did not. To the 
contrary, it noted that it was not overruling precedent but merely holding that a genuine 
issue of fact existed for trial, thus precluding summary judgment. See id. at 1071 n.2. 
Therefore, until such time as this Court determines to overrule itself and accept a burden 
that requires such a low standard of proof that a protestant can simply stumble over it, 
under the principle of stare decisis it must follow its prior rulings. See State v. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). 
In sum, this Court has never held that the burden in change application cases is a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
III. THE DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT FOR SHOWING 
IMPAIRMENT IS NECESSARY AND WORKABLE. 
Milburn asserts that requiring direct evidence is unworkable in these cases. (Mil. 
Br. at 22-26.) However, because such evidence was not present does not mean it is 
impossible to come by. Indeed, the state's own experts testified that while this evidence 
may be difficult to come by, actual testing is the only way to be sure of a hydrologic 
connection. (R. 175 Tr. 177-79; 224:6-9.) 
This is not unheard of. It is the type of evidence that was required in Washington 
County Water Conservancy District v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 82 P.3d 1125. It is the type 
of evidence the Idaho Supreme Court required in In re Boyer when it refused to find 
impairment. See 248 P.2d 540, 545-46 (Idaho 1952) (finding no impairment because 
there was no "determination of a definitive amount of water" that would be lost from 
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approval of a change). And it does not mean that testing is always necessary. For 
example, in Heine v. Reynolds, 367 P.2d 708 (N.M. 1962), impairment was shown 
because there was positive testimony that when water was pumped from a water source it 
increased the salt content of water in the source, which impaired prior vested rights. See 
id at 711. 
Milburn relies on Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, 5 P.3d 
1206, and argues that the Utah Supreme Court does not require such evidence in water 
rights cases. However, Silver Fork is inapposite. It was a quiet title action. See id. at 
^18. Thus, the court was not faced with the same principles and limitations that are 
present in change application cases. In particular here, that the State Engineer, and by 
extension the trial court on de novo review, does not have the authority to adjudicate 
water rights. See Green River Canal Co v. Thavn, 2003 UT 50, Tf30, 84 P.3d 1134. 
However, accepting Milburn5 s arguments this Court will have done just that. 
Milburn also asserts that we have advocated, essentially, a double standard insofar 
as Robinson may have relied on circumstantial evidence in rendering his opinion but we 
are advocating for direct evidence from Milburn. (Mil. Br. at 24.) Milburn is correct in 
this regard and the reason is obvious. Analyzing the respective burdens of applicant and 
protestant by using the Pena pasture metaphor, see State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 
(Utah 1994), when the Searles were attempting to show that their application could be 
approved without impairing Milburn5 s rights, the pasture was large and the trial court, as 
fact finder, was given considerable room to roam—discretion—in making its 
determination. See , e.g.. United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 11, 238 P.2d 1132, 
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1137 (1951); American Fork Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 95, 239 P.2d 188, 191 
(1951); Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n, 2 Utah 2d 141, 143-44, 
270 P.2d 453, 455 (1954); see also Aplt Br. at 21-24, 27-32. 
However, when the burden shifts to the protestant, the pasture of discretion shrinks 
considerably. As we argued below, the only evidence that is legally sufficient to meet the 
burden established by this smaller pasture is evidence that shows, clearly and definitively, 
that the water at point A comes out at point B. It is undisputed this evidence was not 
presented in this case. (Op. at 8, ^32 (finding "there is no direct evidence" of a 
hydrologic connection).) With such evidence the trial court could have definitively 
concluded that Milburn would be impaired if the Searles' Change Application was 
approved. 
Milburn, while not referring specifically to the standard of review and discretion 
afforded the trial court, suggests that such discretion must always be broad because we 
are dealing with scientific issues in which expert testimony must be weighed and 
considered. In Butler, Crockett & Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline 
Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, 98 P.3d 1, this Court recognized that "the importance of 
insuring that the waters of our state are put to beneficial use" mandates the narrowing of 
the discretion afforded trial courts. Id. at ^49-50. Butler, Crockett & Walsh was before 
the court in the context of reviewing a trial court's ruling on beneficial use. See id. at 
1[50. 
Ultimately the court determined the amount of discretion afforded trial courts 
should be significant, though not broad. See id. This was due, in part, to the fact "that 
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the concept of beneficial use is "not static." Id. at [^46. What may constitute beneficial 
use in one case may not constitute beneficial use in the next. See id. Not so with 
impairment. Either an applicant is seeking to draw water from a protestant's source or he 
is not. It is the protestant's burden to show the former. Milbum failed to do so in this 
case. 
In sum, the direct evidence standard for showing impairment is a necessary and 
workable burden to place on protestants after an applicant has made his prima facie case. 
IV. NEITHER MILBURN NOR THE STATE ENGINEER HAVE PROPERLY 
CHALLENGED THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE SEARLES 
MET THEIR PRIMA FACIE BURDEN. 
Milbum and the State Engineer argue that a likely hydrologic connection is the 
greatest possible showing that could have been required of them, because everything else 
is, essentially, junk science. In this regard, they liberally pepper their briefs with excerpts 
of Robinson's testimony, quotes from his publications, and comments from the trial court 
that, read in isolation, suggest that the theory advanced by Forbush and Williamson was 
on firmer scientific footing than Robinson's. 
However, if that was the case, the trial court was free to reject Robinson's view 
and determine that the Searles did not meet their burden of showing non-impairment. 
However, the trial court did not do so. Rather, it accepted Robinson's testimony and 
theory with respect to non-impairment by expressly finding "there is reason to believe the 
groundwater intercepted by and providing the source for the Jacobson Well is a source of 
water completely separate from and has no hydrologic connection with the source of 
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supply for Milburn." (Op. at 7, f31.) On appeal, neither Milburn nor the State Engineer 
challenges this determination as clearly erroneous. 
While it is not necessary for an appellee to file a cross-appeal in arguing to affirm 
on the grounds that the trial court committed an error in another aspect of the case which 
leads to the same result, our appellate courts have never held that this relieves an appellee 
from its obligation to show that error as it would any other issue on appeal. See Nova 
Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, f7, 983 P.2d 575; State v. South, 924 P.2d 
354, 356-57 (Utah 1996). 
Thus, this Court must summarily reject Milburn and the State Engineer's efforts to 
weave uncertainty into Robinson's testimony, and by extension the Searles' prima facie 
case, to gain advantage on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in our opening brief, the trial court's 
judgment must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this p day of March 2005. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
BiyarnJ. Pattison 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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